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I. INTRODUCTION
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA)' was passed
by Congress to assure all handicapped children access to free public education.
The Act sets out detailed requirements that states must fulfill, including re-
quirements for involvement of parents or guardians in their child's educational
program.2 To protect parents' rights, the Act contains procedural safeguards
allowing parents to request a due process hearing when disagreements arise and
ultimately to bring a civil action in state or federal court.3 The Act specifies
that the court will receive the records of the administrative proceeding, hear
additional evidence, make a decision based on the preponderance of the evi-
dence, and grant such relief as it deems appropriate." The Act does not address
the burden of going forward with the evidence at trial or the burden of persua-
sion. As a result, courts have based their decisions on various and inconsistent
allocations, giving various and inconsistent rationales. Since the educational
placements being challenged are not capable of empirically "correct" answers,
but rather are based on professional opinions which take into account various
factors and which are subject to dispute among experts, 5 the outcome can be
affected by where the burden of persuasion lies.
This Note will examine the issues involved in resolving the burden of proof
question against the background of the statute and previous cases which address
the issue, and will suggest that the burden of persuasion is properly placed on
the school. Before addressing the burden of proof issue, this Note will outline
the EAHCA as it relates to the burden of proof, including its purpose and the
procedural safeguards.
II. EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT
A. General History
The EAHCA was enacted by Congress in 1975 to provide states with fund-
ing to help cover the cost of educating handicapped children.' Two principal
district court cases recognizing the right of handicapped children to free public
1. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-61 (West 1978 & Supp. 1990).
2. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412 (West Supp. 1990).
3. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415 (West 1978 & Supp. 1990).
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1988).
5. "We previously have cautioned that courts lack the 'specialized knowledge and experience' necessary to
resolve 'persistent and difficult questions of education policy.'" San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 42 (1973), quoted in Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982).
6. The need for the legislation is based on the states' lack of financial resources to implement recent court
decisions recognizing the right of handicapped children to free public education and on a congressional goal of
providing full educational opportunities to all handicapped children. S. RP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8,
reprinted In 1975 US. CoDE CONG. & ADwN. NEws 1425, 1431-32. It costs nearly twice as much to educate
handicapped children as nonhandicapped children. Comment, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975: What's Left After Rowley?, 19 WILLamaT L. Rav. 715, 719 n.28 (1983).
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education preceded the enactment of EAHCA and provided the basis for the
Act.' In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth,8
the court enjoined the state from denying "to any mentally retarded child ac-
cess to a free public program of education and training."9 The court in Mills v.
Board of Education0 held that handicapped children cannot be excluded from
regular public school assignment unless an adequate alternative education is
provided. The alternative must suit the child's needs and be subject to a prior
hearing and to a periodic review of the child's progress and the adequacy of the
alternative education. 1 ' Based on these two cases and the finding that the edu-
cational needs of more than half of the eight million handicapped children in
the United States were not being fully met, the EAHCA was enacted.'2 The
stated purpose of the EAHCA is
To assure that all handicapped children have available to them ... a free appropriate
public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to
meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their
parents or guardians are protected, to assist States and localities to provide for the
education of all handicapped children, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of
efforts to educate handicapped children.13
B. Requirements Under EAHCA
The substantive and procedural requirements of EAHCA are designed to
promote the goals of the Act. Since the practical goal is to assist states in pro-
viding education to handicapped children, the receipt of federal funds is condi-
tioned on compliance with the Act's requirements. 4 The state must demon-
strate that it "has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the
right to free appropriate public education."' 5
The education of each handicapped child must be tailored to the child's
needs through an individualized education program (IEP).'6 The IEP is pre-
7. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192.
8. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (suit on behalf of retarded children challenging constitutionality of
Pennsylvania statute which excluded them from public school).
9. Id. at 1258.
10. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (suit by handicapped child excluded from the District of Columbia
public school).
11. Id. at 878.
12. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b)(1) & (2) (West Supp. 1990).
13. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c) (West Supp. 1990).
14. 20 U.S.C.A § 1412 (West Supp. 1990).
15. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(1) (West Supp. 1990). which has been interpreted in conjunction with 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1401(18). The Court has defined "appropriate education" to mean "educational instruction specially designed to
meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child 'to
benefit' from the instruction." Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1982). The
Rowley court went on to say that "the Act was more to open the door of public education to handicapped children
on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside." Id. at 192. This restrictive
reading has been criticized. See, e.g., Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 6 at 725; Wegner,
Educational Rights of Handicapped Children" Three Federal Statutes and an Evolving Jurisprudence Part 1:
The Statutory Maze, 17 J.L. & ED. 387, 388 (1988).
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(19) (1989), defining IEP:
The term "individualized education program" means a written statement for each handicapped child developed in
any meeting by a representative of the local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit who shall be
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pared by the local education agency with parental input and approval, and must
be reviewed annually.17 Along with the requirement of parental involvement in
the development and review of the IEP, the Act requires procedural safeguards,
set out at 20 U.S.C. § 1415, to guarantee the rights of handicapped children
and their parents."8
Parents must be given an opportunity to examine all relevant records, 19 be
given written notice prior to any proposed change or a refusal to initiate change
of any service required by the Act,20 be fully informed of the procedures under
the Act,2 ' and be given the opportunity to present a complaint with respect to
any matter covered by the Act.22 The detailed procedural safeguards emphasize
the Act's goal of involving parents in the development of their child's IEP and
protecting the rights of handicapped children and their parents.
Disputes often revolve around the child's IEP and changes proposed by ei-
ther the school or the parents. Once a complaint is made, the Act requires an
impartial due process hearing conducted by the state or local education
agency. 23 If the hearing is conducted by the local agency, any party can appeal
to the state agency which conducts an impartial review and makes an indepen-
dent decision.24 At these hearings the parents have the right to be accompanied
by counsel, to present evidence, and to receive written findings of fact.25 "Any
party aggrieved by the findings and decision" has a right to a civil suit in re-
spect to the complaint in state or district court.26
C. Standard of Review
The Act clearly states that the court shall base its decision on a preponder-
ance of the evidence after receiving the record of the administrative proceedings
and after hearing any additional evidence the parties wish to present.2 7 The
qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of
handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child,
which statement shall include -
(A) a statement of the present levels of the educational performance of such child,
(B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives,
(C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such child, and the extent to which such
child will be able to participate in regular educational programs,
(D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services, and
(E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual
basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved.
17. Id.
18. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415 (West 1978 & Supp. 1990), establishing a hearing procedure, review by the state
educational agency, and a right to a civil action.
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1988).
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C) (1988).
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(D) (1988).
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(l)(E) (1988).
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1988).
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1988).
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1988).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1988).
27. Id.
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United States Supreme Court in Hendrick Hudson District Board of Education
v. Rowley28 has interpreted this standard of review not as
an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy
for those of the school authorities . . . . The fact that Section 1415(e) requires that
the reviewing court 'receive the records of the [state] administrative proceedings' car-
ries with it the implied requirement that due weight shall be given to these
proceedings.2 9
The Court then went on to find the inquiry requires a two-step process. The first
step is to analyze the procedural compliance with the Act;30 the second step is
to analyze the substantive aspects of the IEP and whether it is "calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits."' '
This level of review has been interpreted by lower courts as something less
than de novo review, 32 but something more than the traditional narrow level of
review given administrative decisions.3 3 It has been suggested that giving "due
weight" to an administrative agency finding means "the court is to consider the
administrative determination . . . as a factor to take into account in reaching
its decision." ' 4
The fact that the court is to hear additional evidence of the parties indi-
cates that Congress intended more than the traditional level of judicial review
of an agency determination. 5 More comprehensive review will promote admin-
istrative efficiency and help to overcome any agency bias.36 Those who oppose
more extensive court review cite courts' lack of expertise in an area such as the
education of handicapped children.37 The current scope of review under
EAHCA, as interpreted by Rowley, directs the court to give due weight to the
agency determination while still following the explicit language of the statute
requiring the taking of additional evidence and the making of an independent
decision. This scope of review strikes a balance between protecting parental
rights and giving due regard to the school's expertise.' 8
28. 458 U.S. 176 (1982) (parents of child with only minimal residual hearing brought suit to review adminis-
trative process that upheld school district's denial of parents' request that child be provided a sign-language inter-
preter in all academic classes).
29. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. This standard has been criticized as contrary to the legislative intent. See, e.g.,
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 216-18 (White, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 6, at 732.
30. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
31. Id. at 206-07. The Court emphasized that achieving passing grades and advancing from grade to grade
are important factors to consider in determining educational benefit. Id. at 207 n.28.
32. "Thus while a trial de nove is not called for, the court has some latitude in reviewing the decision of the
state hearing officer." Lang v. Braintree School Comm., 545 F. Supp. 1221, 1226 (D. Mass. 1982), quoted in
Tracey T. v. McDaniel, 610 F. Supp. 947, 948 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
33. Traditionally the courts show significant deference when reviewing administrative agency determinations.
B. SCHWARTZ, ADwNISTRATIVE LAW 584-85 (2d ed. 1984).
34. Guernsey, When the Teachers and Parents Can't Agree, Who Really Decides? Burdens of Proof and
Standards of Review Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 36 CLEv. ST. L. Rav. 67, 85
(1988); using the analysis of the Supreme Court in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951),
which held a trial court need not give an examiner's findings "more weight than in reason and in light of judicial
experience they deserve" but should be accorded the "relevance that they reasonably command in answering the
comprehensive question whether the evidence supporting the Board's order is substantial." Id. at 496-97.
35. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 33, at 587.
36. See L. JAM', JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMNISTRAIVE ACTION 360 (1965).
37. Cf. S. BREYER & R. STEWART. AmnNISmTwATv LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 307 (1979).
38. Parents can present expert testimony, but may not have as ready access to experts as the school does.
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III. BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Traditional Requirements
"Nowhere, however, do the statutes or regulations address the basic issue
before us, the allocation of the burden of persuasion or proof."39 As a result,
courts are forced to draw on traditional allocations of the burden of proof and
persuasion and the legislative intent of the EAHCA.
The burden of proof refers to two issues: the burden of going forward with
the evidence and the burden of persuasion. 40 The traditional rule is that the
burden of going forward and the burden of persuasion are on the moving party
in both court and administrative proceedings. 41 However, there are many excep-
tions and alternative considerations in allocating the burdens. The court may
allocate the burden to the party which has more access to the evidence,'42 the
party whose contention goes against the probabilities,'4 or when a statute is
relied upon, whether the matter alleged is the exception according to the lan-
guage of the statute.44 While the burden of going forward and burden of per-
suasion often go together, they can be separated. The burden of going forward
may even change during the trial. The court will consider the various factors in
light of the underlying purpose of the Act in determining where to place the
burden.'5
Using the traditional rule that the burden of production and persuasion lie
on the party initiating a change, the burden would often fall on the parents who
bring a suit as a result of a complaint under Section 1514(e). Putting the bur-
den on the parents seems contrary to the Act's concern with protecting the
rights of parents and their handicapped child and with encouraging parental
involvement. Placing the burden on the school would be more in keeping with
the purpose of the Act and its extensive procedural safeguards. 4' Shifting the
burden to the school can also be justified by the school's greater access to evi-
dence on the appropriateness of the IEP as compared to parents who will be
more burdened to find experts able to evaluate the educational program. 47
The courts have used these traditional principles as a starting point for
allocating the burden of proof in EAHCA cases. The burden of going forward
has caused less trouble than the burden of persuasion, which is more burden-
some on the party. Requiring the party initiating the suit to produce enough
evidence for the court to find reasonable grounds to hear the case is generally
not an unreasonable burden. However, the allocation of the burden of persua-
39. Lascari v. Bd. of Educ., 116 N.J. 30, 43, 560 A.2d 1180, 1187 (1989) ("parents of neurologically...
impaired child sued school district for reimbursement of tuition and room and board expenses of private
[school]"). Id. at 30, 560 A.2d 1180.
40. B. SCHWARTz, supra note 33, at 359.
41. Id.
42. McCORMICK ON EvIDENCE 950 (E. Cleary 1984).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 951.
45. Lascari, 116 NJ. at 43-46, 560 A.2d at 1187.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 6-13, describing the Act and its purpose.
47. See S-1 v. Turlinglon, 635 F.2d 342, 349 (5th Cir. 1981).
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sion can affect whether a suit is brought at all and the outcome of a suit once it
is brought. For this reason, the disputes over the proper allocation of the burden
generally center around the burden of persuasion; therefore this Note will also
focus on the issues involved in allocating the burden of persuasion.
B. Cases Interpreting EAHCA and Burden of Proof
"Across the country other courts have struggled with determining which
party bears the burden of proving the appropriateness or inappropriateness of
the education provided by the district."' 8 The courts have placed the burden on
the schools, on the parents, or on the party seeking a change. The Supreme
Court has not resolved this issue, and it continues to be resolved differently in
different courts. The court in Lenhoff by Lenhoff v. Farmington Public
Schools,4' refusing to rule on the issue as it would be an advisory opinion,50
noted that each side has numerous cases to cite for the proposition that the
burden lies with the other.5" This Note will examine the various court decisions
addressing the burden of persuasion and explain why the decision to place the
burden of persuasion on the school district best carries out the purpose of the
EAHCA.
1. Cases Placing Burden on the School
The recent Supreme Court of New Jersey decision, Lascari v. Board of
Education,52 clearly addresses the burden of persuasion issue, stating that "it is
more consistent with the State and federal scheme to place the burden on the
school district not only when it seeks to change the IEP, but also when the
parents seek the change."15 3 The case involved a suit brought by the parents of a
neurologically and conceptually impaired child who believed their son was re-
ceiving insufficient academic instruction under his present IEP.54 After the par-
ents and the school were unable to agree on the appropriateness of the IEP, the
parents enrolled their son in a private high school specializing in teaching chil-
dren with severe dyslexia and sought reimbursement for the cost of tuition
based on the inappropriateness of the education he was receiving in the public
high school. 55 The case had been remanded by the Appellate Division to the
Chancery Division with instruction to place the burden of persuasion on the
48. Lascari, 116 N.J. at 43, 560 A.2d at 1187.
49. 680 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (parents of an emotionally handicapped child challenge state level
decision regarding child's evaluation and placement).
50. Id. at 927.
51. Id. at 926-27. Favoring the parents, see Davis v, Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 530 F. Supp. 1209,
1211-12 (D.D.C. 1982); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir. 1982); Lang v. Braintree School Comm.,
545 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Mass. 1982). Favoring the school, see Doe v. Brookline School Comm., 722 F.2d 910
(1st Cir. 1983); Burger v. Murray County School Dist., 612 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Bales v. Clarke, 523
F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. Va. 1981).
52. 116 N.J. 30, 560 A.2d 1180.
53. Id. at 44, 560 A.2d at 1188.
54. Although their son had an IQ of 126, a high average, he was still reading at the second grade level in
high school. Id. at 37-38, 560 A.2d at 1184.
55. Id. at 38-39, 560 A.2d at 1184-85.
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parents to prove that the school district was unable to provide an appropriate
education.5"
The state supreme court granted certification 57 and reversed. The court
noted that although courts had gone both ways with the issue, "[u]nderlying the
• . . federal regulations is an abiding concern for the welfare of handicapped
children and their parents. Consistent with that concern, the basic obligation to
provide a handicapped child with a free, appropriate education is placed on the
local school district."5 8 Provisions of the Act and the reasoning of other courts
were cited to support the court's allocation.
Placing the burden of persuasion on the school is consistent with the provi-
sions of the EAHCA which place the burden of identifying handicapped chil-
dren and formulating IEPs on the school.59 Additionally, the remedial purpose
of the EAHCA supports placing the burden of persuasion on the school, as
explained in S-i v. Turlington.60 The court in S-1 went on to say that the "con-
clusion is buttressed by the fact that in most cases, the handicapped students
and their parents lack the wherewithal either to know or to assert their rights
under the [EAHCA]."O' Without explicitly deciding the issue, the Supreme
Court of Virginia assumed that the lower court properly allocated the burden of
persuasion to the school in a dispute concerning free appropriate education.
62
In Grymes v. Madden, the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court's alloca-
tion of the burden of proof to the school district in deciding whether an appro-
priate public program existed . 3 The case involved an appeal by the State Board
of Education of a district court decision awarding parents reimbursement for
private education of their handicapped son during the pendency of proceedings
under Section 1415(e) .64 The court gave little explanation except to say that the
school district had failed to meet its burden.
The court in Davis v. District of Columbia Board of Educations held that
the school district shoulders the burden of proof to show that its proposal is
appropriate during the due process hearing.6 The rationale used by the court to
explain the allocation of the burden during the due process hearing is equally
applicable to the allocation to be used at trial. The court relied on the language
of the statute and the ruling in Mills v. Board of Education,67 which formed
the basis for the statute. The court in Mills set out specific procedures which
the school district must follow in implementing the court's decree that all chil-
56. Id. at 42, 560 A.2d at 1186-87.
57. 110 N.J. 319, 540 A.2d 1295 (1988).
58. 116 N.J. at 44, 560 A.2d at 1188.
59. Id.
60. 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981) (burden of raising the issue of whether a student's misconduct is a manifes-
tation of the student's handicap invoking the procedural protection of EAHCA is on the school in expulsion
proceedings).
61. Id. at 349.
62. School Bd. of Campbell County v. Beasley, 380 S.E.2d 884, 889 (1989) (school board challenged review-
ing officer's decision that school did not provide handicapped student with free appropriate education).
63. 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir. 1982).
64. Id.
65. 530 F. Supp. 1209 (D.D.C. 1982) (parents sought clarification of placement process under EAHCA).
66. Id. at 1211-12.
67. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
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dren excluded from regular public school assignment be provided an adequate
alternative and a constitutionally adequate prior hearing. In the hearing re-
quired by Mills, the "defendants [the school] shall bear the burden of proof as
to all facts and as to the appropriateness of any placement, denial of placement
or transfer."68 By comparison, Davis involved determination of the the proper
issues to be considered at the due process hearing when the parents are seeking
reimbursement for tuition. 69 The Davis court stated that the only issue properly
before the hearing officer is the appropriateness of the school's proposed IEP
and the school district has the burden of proving the IEP is appropriate.70 Re-
imbursement is not a separate issue except to the extent that the school must
pay for whatever placement is appropriate.71 If a private school is deemed ap-
propriate and the parents have been paying for that school, then the parents will
be entitled to reimbursement.7 2
2. Burden on the Party Seeking the Change
A number of court decisions have resolved the burden issue by stating that
the burden is on the party seeking the change. Interestingly, these cases gener-
ally involved a change in the IEP proposed by the school which the parents then
sought to prevent.
An exception is Tracey T. v. McDaniel" which involved parents of a hand-
icapped daughter who challenged her 1981 IEP and sought in advance of trial a
ruling on the burden of proof issue.74 The court cited various cases, discussed
below, which placed the burden on the party seeking the change. This allocation
is explained as following logically from the fact that the IEP is a placement
which both the school and parents at one point agreed was appropriate.7 5
While it is true that the Act requires parental involvement, it is unlikely
that the school and the parents play an equal role in its development or have
equal ability to judge its appropriateness. 76 Because of the unequal control and
expertise, this rationale for placing the burden on the party seeking the change
is not as strong as it first appears. In addition, while an IEP may initially ap-
pear appropriate, in practice the IEP may not actually be beneficial for the
child. Such situations lead to disputes over the IEP's approriateness. The par-
ents' original cooperation with the school and its proposed IEP should not work
against the parents should they later seek to challenge the IEP.
The court in Burger v. Murray County School District77 decided the bur-
den of proof issue in the context of a school district that had proposed removing
a child from a residential school and placing the child in a self-contained class
68. Id. at 881.
69. Davis, 530 F. Supp. at 1211.
70. Id. at 1211-12.
71. Id. at 1212.
72. Id.
73. 610 F. Supp. 947 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
74. Id. at 948.
75. Id. at 949.
76. See S-1, 635 F. Supp. at 349.
77. 612 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
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within the school district. The parents challenged the change and the court had
to decide which party bore the burden of persuasion on the appropriateness of
the proposed change.7 8 The school district relied on Bales v. Clarke7 9 for the
proposition that the parents bear the burden of proof. The court distinguished
Bales on the facts and went on to say that the decision was not legally persua-
sive since no explanation was given for the placement of the burden on the
parents.8 0 The court surveyed other court decisions addressing the burden of
proof issue and chose to adopt the reasoning of those courts placing the burden
on the party seeking the change. The court cited Lang v. Braintree School
Committees" and Doe v. Brookline School Committee82 as offering a persuasive
rationale for placing the burden on the party seeking the change.83
The Lang court explained its placing the burden of proof on the school
district as a combination of the school's failure to adhere to the procedural re-
quirements of the EAHCA and of the Act's preference for the status quo when
the child is already receiving an appropriate education. 8' The case involved a
challenge by the parents of a mentally retarded, mentally ill, and epileptic
daughter who attended private school paid for by the school district.8 5 When the
parents moved to Braintree, the district refused to pay for the private school
and proposed an IEP which placed the child in the public school. The Langs
were not included in the development of the long range IEP.8" The court's deci-
sion to place the burden of proof on the school district was partly based on
Section 1415(e)(3) which directs that the child remain in the current educa-
tional setting during the pendency of any proceedings under the Act. This provi-
sion was interpreted as a preference for the status quo."' Moreover, the alloca-
tion of the burden to the school district rested largely on the facts of the case,
particularly on the fact that the school failed to follow the procedural require-
ments of the Act. 8 The importance of the procedural safeguards was estab-
lished in Rowley,8 9 which held that the analysis of any IEP was a two-step
process, one step involving procedure and the other involving the substance of
the IEP.9 °
The court in Doe9" placed the burden on the party seeking a modification
of the status quo because of the congressional preference for the status quo.
9 2
78. Id. at 434-35.
79. 523 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. Va. 1981), discussed in Burger, 612 F. Supp. at 436. The Bales court stated
that the handicapped child bears the burden to establish that public school is inappropriate and that no other state
facility is appropriate.
80. Burger, 612 F. Supp. at 436.
81. 545 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Mass. 1982).
82. 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983).
83. Burger, 612 F. Supp. at 437.
84. Lang, 545 F. Supp. at 1228.
85. Id. at 1224.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1228.
88. Id.
89. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
90. Id. at 206-07.
91. Doe, 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983).
92. Id. at 919.
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The court discussed the preference for maintaining the status quo in the place-
ment of the child during the pendency of the review process; however, the deci-
sion limited its holding to cases seeking funding of interim placement. 3 Doe
involved a challenge by the school to an earlier court decision ordering the
school to pay the cost of private tuition to the parents of a child with severe
learning disabilities currently enrolled in private school.94 The court held that
since the school was seeking to change the status quo, it had the burden of
making a motion for a preliminary injunction to allow it to stop payment.95 The
court went on to state that the party seeking the change - the school - would
have the burden of proof on the appropriateness of the education offered by the
school district.986 The case interpreted Section 1415(e)(3) as establishing "a
preference, but not a statutory duty, for maintenance of the status quo."9 The
court also cites the legislative history as supporting this view of the Act's prefer-
ence - not mandate - for the status quo.98
The court in Burger" also relied on the fact that the IEP under attack was
a joint effort of the parents and the school as a rationale for placing the burden
on the party seeking the change, citing Tatro v. Texas. 00 In Tatro the court
decided whether the need for Clean Intermittent Catheterization (CIC)' °' fell
within the related services requirement of EAHCA.' °' The school claimed that
it was not a related service and that the child should be moved from her current
placement to a residential setting if she required CIC. The court held that the
school district should bear the burden of proof because of the presumption de-
veloped in Rowley in favor of an established IEP.10 3 "Moreover, because the
IEP is jointly developed by the school district and the parents, fairness requires
that the party attacking its terms should bear the burden of showing why the
educational setting established by the IEP is not appropriate."" 4 The problems
with this argument were discussed at the beginning of this section.
The court in Town of Burlington v. Department of Education'0 5 held that
"[a]s a general principle. . . the burden of proof is on the party who seeks to
overturn the findings. . . of the agency" because this assists courts in reviewing
an administrative determination as encouraged in Rowley. 0 8 The court indi-
cated that no burden could be assigned regarding appropriateness of the place-
93. Id. at 915.
94. Id. at 913.
95. Id. at 917.
96. Id. at 919.
97. Id. at 918.
98. Id. Explaining the due process provisions of the bill to the Senate, Sen. Stafford is quoted as stating that
the Act is concerned with unnecessary delays in a chanie of placement; therefore, the Act takes a flexible ap-
proach to meet the needs of the child and the state. 121 CONG. REc. 37,412 (1975), quoted in Doe, 722 F.2d at
918.
99. 612 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
100. 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983).
101. CIC is a procedure for manually draining the bladder. Id. at 828 n.5.
102. Id. at 825.
103. Id. at 830.
104. Id.
105. 736 F.2d 773 (Ist Cir.), cert. granted, 469 U.S. 1071 (1984), affd, 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
106. Id. at 794.
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ment for the years subsequent to that year for which the state agency ruled,
since neither party was appealing the appropriateness of the subsequent place-
ment or an agency decision.10 7 The case involved a suit by the school district to
reverse only the findings of the administrative agency that a private school
placement was appropriate, therefore, the burden was placed on the school re-
garding the years prior to the agency findings. The case was appealed to the
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari, but only as to whether Section
1415(e)(2) includes reimbursement to parents for private tuition and whether
Section 1415(e)(3) bars such reimbursement to parents who place their child in
private school without the consent of local authorities. 08
3. Cases Placing the Burden on the Parents
As a general rule, few cases place the burden of proof on the parents.
Cases which do state that generally the burden is on the parent do not give a
rationale for this placement. In Bales v. Clarke,09 the court stated that
"[p]laintiff [the handicapped child] bears the burden to establish that the Re-
gional School is inappropriate, that no other State facility is appropriate, and
that Accotink Academy [the child's private school] is appropriate."' " The court
gives no explanation for placing this heavy burden of proof on the child, a bur-
den which includes not only proving the inappropriateness of the current educa-
tional placement, but the inappropriateness of any educational placement which
the school could provide.
Other courts have indicated that in challenging the placement and educa-
tional program, only that IEP actually offered is under consideration."' The
best explanation of the Bales decision is that the court felt that the parents
bringing suit through their handicapped child were asking for more than they
deserved and the court wanted to ensure they received nothing. The parents
were seeking reimbursement for various expenses they incurred relating to the
child, including a summer program for the child and travel expenses for them to
visit the child. Another court explained the case as applying only when the par-
ents seek the change and criticized the decision overall for its lack of legal
reasoning."'
The court in Cothern v. Mallory"' also made a conclusory statement that
the parents failed to carry their burden in ruling for the school.,"4 The case
involved a challenge by the parents of a severely handicapped son of the state
107. Id.
108. Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 469 U.S. 1071 (1985). See infra note 129 and
accompanying text, summarizing the Court's holding.
109. 523 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. Va. 1981).
110. Id. at 1370.
111. See, e.g., Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 (1985), Hendrick
Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982), Lascari v. Bd. of Educ., 116 N.J. 30, 46, 560
A.2d 1180, 1189 (1989).
112. Burger v. Murray County School Dist., 612 F. Supp. 434, 436 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
113. 565 F. Supp. 701 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
114. Id. at 708.
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school board's placement of their son in a state school.'1 5 The court ruled for
the state, finding that the parents had "not offered any evidence which suggests
that the instruction and services offered by the State are not offered at public
expense, [and] do not meet the State's educational standards . ... The
court gave no explanation for this allocation, and then went on to say that the
IEP offered by the school was appropriate." 7 Therefore the court not only
looked to see if the parents had proven that the IEP was inappropriate, but
went further in finding the state's challenged IEP was indeed appropriate. Plac-
ing the burden of proving the appropriateness of the IEP on the school would be
more in line with the court's analysis than the allocation the court stated it was
using.
The cases which place the burden of persuasion on the parents seem to
involve cases where the parents are challenging the current placement and the
court eventually rules for the school. These decisions place an additional burden
on parents who seek to invoke the protection of the procedural safegaurds of
EAHCA and are contrary to a major goal of the Act. The EAHCA seeks to
both protect parents and their handicapped children and encourage parental
involvement.1 18 Parents who seek to use the protection offered by the Act should
not be forced to bear the burden of persuasion. If these cases which allocated
the burden to the parents involved suits where parents had brought needless
challenges, they still could be handled under a system which places the burden
on the school district. The school district is able to bear the burden of persua-
sion on the appropriateness of its education plan far more easily than the par-
ents in valid challenges. If the IEP is clearly appropriate and the parents have
brought a needless challenge, the school with its experts and knowledge should
be able to demonstrate the appropriateness of the IEP. With the clear purpose
of the Act being the protection of handicapped children and their parents, the
burden should not be placed on the parents.
C. Policy
The EAHCA was enacted by Congress to assist states in funding education
for handicapped children.1 9 Congress felt that states were doing an inadequate
job of educating handicapped children and that lack of funding was a primary
reason.120 The Act's ultimate goal is that all handicapped children will be pro-
vided, at state expense, an appropriate education . 2' The Act maintains the
traditional role of the state in formulating and executing educational policy,
115. Id. at 702.
116. Id. at 707.
117. Id.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 14-26.
119. Id.
120. Supra note 6. Even with federal assistance there is an economic preference for placing handicapped
children in public school classrooms due to the high cost of residential placement. Note, Resolving Placement and
Financial Disputes Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 763, 767-
68 n.33 (1985).
121. See supra note 15 and accompanying text, giving the definition of "appropriate education" as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court.
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placing the responsibility for formulating the IEP with the state and local agen-
cies with parental involvement.' Because the Act left wide discretion to the
school and because of the difficulty of measuring the state's compliance, the Act
includes a compliance mechanism, in the form of detailed conflict resolution and
review procedures, which also serves as procedural protection for the rights of
parents and children. 123 In addition to the goal of assuring all handicapped chil-
dren the right to public education, the Act incudes as its purpose "to assure that
the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are pro-
tected."' 2 4 Thus, procedural safeguards serve two complementary goals: to en-
sure the proper use of discretion and to protect parental rights.2 5
A similar area where the burden of persuasion is shifted to the agency
based on a desire to protect the individual is in social security disability cases.' 28
Under these cases the claimant has the burden of going forward but the burden
of persuasion is on the agency.' 27 Once the claimant offers probative evidence to
indicate he is not able to perform his job because of a disability, he is entitled to
receive disability benefits unless the agency meets its burden of persuasion in
proving work is available which the claimant can perform.
28
In light of the important functions of the procedural safeguards, the burden
of proof issue needs to be allocated in a way which both enhances the effective-
ness of the procedures and promotes the Act's goals. Allocating the burden of
persuasion to the school in all cases would serve such a function. With required
parental involvement, the school is primarily responsible for the development of
the IEP. Once the IEP is challenged, the school should have the burden of prov-
ing the appropriateness of the educational program. The school will have easier
access to experts in the field and other records pertaining to the development of
the educational program to be used as evidence. To require the parents or the
party seeking the change, which usually is the parents, to bear the burden of
proof in a case brought under an Act designed to protect parental rights and
ensure compliance from schools would conflict with the intent of Congress.
Currently parents are unsure what type of a case they need to win when
deciding whether to bring a civil suit. This can be important when parents are
making the decision to withdraw their child from the public school and place
the child in a private school because of an inappropriate educational program at
the public school. The Supreme Court has validated the right of parents to re-
imbursement for tuition when the parents have changed the placement of their
child during the pendency of proceedings challenging the IEP if the court ulti-
mately determines that such private placement is appropriate rather than the
122. "Historically, the States have had the primary responsibility for the education of children at the elemen-
tary and secondary level." 121 CONG. REc. 19,498 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Dole), quoted in Rowley, 458 U.S. at
208 n.30.
123. S. REP. No. 198, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 25, reprinted in 1975 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1425,
1449 [hereinafter S. REP.].
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. 1988).
125. Hyatt, Litigating the Rights of Handicapped Children To An Appropriate Educatiorn Procedures and
Remedies, 29 UCLA L. Rav. 1, 11 (1981).
126. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 33, at 361-62.
127. Id. at 361.
128. Id. at 362.
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school's IEP."19 Since parents may not be able to afford the high cost of private
education, their chance of success in the civil suit may play a major role in their
decision whether to place their child in a private school.
One of the goals of the EAHCA is to involve parents in the development of
their child's educational plan both as a policy matter and as a monitoring func-
tion.130 The current unsettled state of the law works against the procedural safe-
guards of the EAHCA. The issue of the burden of persuasion needs to be re-
solved so parents can make informed choices and so the procedural safeguards
can serve the goals of the EAHCA fully. This issue can be permanently re-
solved by amending the Act which is specific in most parts of the procedural
safeguard section to be equally specific as to the burden of proof in cases
brought under Section 1415.
IV. CONCLUSION
The EAHCA was enacted to assist states in providing education to all
handicapped children. The Act leaves development of the actual educational
plan to the state or local education agency with parental involvement. To pro-
tect the rights of handicapped children and their parents, and to monitor the
state's compliance, the EAHCA contains detailed procedural safeguards. The
procedures include the right to a civil suit if a conflict arises between the par-
ents and the school. The Act states that the court shall receive the record of
prior administrative proceedings, receive any additional evidence which the par-
ties have, and make an independent decision based upon the preponderance of
the evidence. The statute does not indicate which party bears the burden of
persuasion and the courts have allocated the burden to the school, the parents,
or the party seeking the change. As a result, parents are uncertain what type of
case is needed to succeed, and thus the procedural safeguards of the EAHCA
do not fully serve their purpose.
The burden of persuasion in suits brought under EAHCA needs to be re-
solved so that the procedural safeguards will be most effective. Although the
courts have made allocations based on differing rationales, most often the bur-
den is allocated to the schools. The courts explain this allocation based on the
school's seeking the change, the school's access to information, or the legislative
intent of the EAHCA. The position of the schools relative to the parents, and
the goals of the EAHCA most strongly justify allocating the burden to the
schools. The congressional concern with parents' rights evidenced by the exten-
sive procedural safeguards and stated purpose of the Act are best served when
the burden of persuasion is allocated to the schools in a suit brought under the
EAHCA.
Elizabeth L. Anstaett
129. Burlington School Comm. v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-74 (1985) (holding that a parent
does not waive the right to reimbursement for expenses of a private education by changing the placement of the
child during the pendency of proceedings reviewing a challenged IEP).
130. See S. REP., supra note 123.
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